

INTEL ME: FLASH FILE SYSTEM EXPLAINED

Contents

1. Introduction.....	3
2. MFS Partition	4
2.1. MFS Pagination	4
2.2. Chunks.....	5
2.3. System Page.....	5
2.4. Data Page.....	6
2.5. Data Area	6
2.6. System Area	7
2.7. Data Extraction	7
2.8. MFS Templates Statistics.....	8
3. MFS Usage.....	9
3.1. Special Files.....	9
3.2. intel.cfg (fitc.cfg) Structure	10
3.3. MFS Folder (Directory).....	11
3.4. Integrity, Encryption, Anti-Replay	12
4. File System Security Keys.....	13
4.1. RPMC Keys	13
4.2. Integrity and Confidentiality Keys	13
4.3. Hardware Security Engines.....	13
4.4. Keys Derivation and Usage Practices	14
5. Conclusion	15

1. Introduction

The Intel Management Engine (ME) technology was introduced in 2005. Though more than 10 years have passed, it is still very hard to find any official information about ME on the Internet. The purpose of this document is to detail how ME 11.x stores its state on the Flash.

If you need background information, please refer to the following additional materials:

1. [Platform Embedded Security Technology Revealed](#)
2. [Intel ME Secrets](#)
3. [Intel ME: The Way of the Static Analysis](#)
4. [Intel ME 11.x Firmware Images Unpacker](#)

The SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) Flash chip contains BIOS, data related to GbE (Gigabit Ethernet), ME Region, and so on.

If Intel ME 11.x Firmware Images Unpacker parses the ME region, the output directory contains a file named **.MFS.part*, which includes the MFS partition.

2. MFS Partition

The MFS partition stores a file system that contains ME-related data between runs. MFS is designed with the view of the following Flash memory features:

- Any byte could be written independently
- Need erase (make all bits=1) before re-writing
- Erasing with the precision of a block (e.g., 8K) only
- Limited number of guaranteed erase cycles
 - Usually between 10,000 and 1,000,000
 - Inerasable block should be marked as “bad”

After extraction of binary resources from `fit.exe`, it is easy to find three files that represent empty MFS containers:

```
AFS_region_256K.bin
AFS_region_400K.bin
AFS_region_1272K.bin
```

The container size is specified in the file name (256, 400, or 1272 KiB). The maximum number of files that can be stored in these containers is 512, 256, and 1024 respectively.

2.1. MFS Pagination

All the `cbMFS` bytes of MFS could be considered as a set of separate `nPages` with the size of `MFS_PAGE_SIZE == 8192(0x2000)` bytes each. The page size is likely to equal the size of Erase Block, which is a Flash memory property.

```
#define MFS_PAGE_SIZE 0x2000
cbMFS = sizeof(MFS); // Size of MFS partition
nPages = cbMFS / MFS_PAGE_SIZE; // Total number of pages
```

At any specific moment, “`nPages/12`” pages store *System* information. “`nPages - nPages/12 - 1`” pages contain files *Data*. One page is always *Empty*.

```
nSysPages = nPages / 12; // Number of System pages
nDataPages = nPages - nSysPages - 1; // Number of Data pages
```

Each page starts with an 18-byte header:

```
typedef struct {
    unsigned __int32 signature; // Page signature == 0xAA557887
    unsigned __int32 USN; // Update Sequence Number
    unsigned __int32 nErase; // How many times page was erased
    unsigned __int16 iNextErase; // Index of Next-to-be-erased page
    unsigned __int16 firstChunk; // Index of first chunk (for Data page)
    unsigned __int8 csum; // Page Header checksum (for first 16 bytes)
    unsigned __int8 b0; // Always 0
} T_MFS_Page_Hdr; // 18 == 0x12 bytes
```

The *Empty* page has an invalid `sign` field ($\neq 0xAA557887$). The *System* page always has 0 in the `firstChunk` field. All the other pages are *Data* pages.

2.2. Chunks

Each page contains several 66(0x42)-byte chunks. A chunk is an MFS' primary addressable (and modifiable) unit.

The first 64(0x40) bytes of each chunk are used for payload storing. The next two bytes store CCITT CRC-16 calculated from the chunk data and chunk index.

```
#define MFS_CHUNK_SIZE 0x40
typedef struct {
    unsigned __int8 data[MFS_CHUNK_SIZE]; // Payload
    unsigned __int16 crc16; // Checksum
} T_MFS_Chunk; // 66 == 0x42 bytes
```

Note. Reversing CRC-16 allows easy calculation of the chunk index.

2.3. System Page

There is an array of 16-bit indices `axIdx` in the *System* page right after the Page Header. The number of entries in `axIdx` equals to the *number of chunks* + 1. Each *System* page contains 120(0x78) chunks started from the 260(0x104) offset.

```
#define SYS_PAGE_CHUNKS 120
typedef struct {
    T_MFS_Page_Hdr hdr; // Page header
    unsigned __int16 axIdx[SYS_PAGE_CHUNKS+1]; // Obfuscated indices
    T_MFS_Chunk chunks[SYS_PAGE_CHUNKS]; // System chunks
} T_MFS_System_Page;

nSysPageChunks = (MFS_PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(T_MFS_Page_Hdr) - 2) /
    (2 + sizeof(T_MFS_Chunk)); // 120(0x78) chunks per System page
```

Initially, each `axIdx` entry contains the 0xFFFF value. The 0x8000 bit is cleared for the entry that follows the last used entry. The next bit 0x4000 is cleared for the used entries. Indices stored in `axIdx` are obfuscated by XORing with dynamic secret. The secret value depends on the previous value from

`axIdx`. Its calculation involves the modified version of CRC-16 (stripped to 14 bits).

2.4. Data Page

There is the `aFree` byte array in the *Data* page immediately after the Page Header. The number of entries in `aFree` equals to the number of chunks. Each *Data* page contains 122(0x7A) chunks started from the 140(0x8C) offset.

```
#define DATA_PAGE_CHUNKS 122
typedef struct {
    T_MFS_Page_Hdr hdr; // Page header
    unsigned __int8 aFree[DATA_PAGE_CHUNKS]; // Free chunks map
    T_MFS_Chunk chunks[DATA_PAGE_CHUNKS]; // Data chunks
} T_MFS_Data_Page;

nDataPageChunks = (MFS_PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(T_MFS_Page_Hdr)) /
    (1 + sizeof(T_MFS_Chunk)); // 122(0x7A) chunks per Data page
```

Initially, each entry of `aFree` contains the 0xFF value. When a chunk is used, a corresponding `aFree` entry is zeroed.

2.5. Data Area

All the chunks from *Data* pages build the *Data* area. Each *Data* page contains chunks with sequential numbers starting from `hdr.firstChunk`. Minimal value of the `hdr.firstChunk` field among all *Data* pages equals to `nSysChunks` (logical number of chunks in the *System* area). Each *Data* area has only one *Data* chunk with a specific index.

The total number of `nDataChunks` is calculated by multiplying the number of *Data* pages and the number of chunks on a single *Data* page, which is 122(0x7A).

Data area capacity is calculated by multiplying the number of *Data* chunks and the chunk payload size, which is 64(0x40) bytes.

```
nDataChunks = nDataPages * nDataPageChunks; // Number of Data chunks
cbData = nDataChunks * MFS_CHUNK_SIZE; // Data area capacity
```

2.6. System Area

Unlike the Data area, System chunks are stored not sequentially but in accordance with an update order. A Chunk index for the System page is derived from a corresponding value in `axIdx`. System chunks with a specific index are not unique, but only the last entry can be used. To restore a proper order, we need to handle System pages in accordance with USN growth.

The System area starts with 14-byte Volume Header:

```
typedef struct {
    unsigned __int32 sign; // Volume signature == 0x724F6201
    unsigned __int32 ver; // Volume version == 1
    unsigned __int32 cbTotal; // Volume capacity (System area+Data area)
    unsigned __int16 nFiles; // Number of file records
} T_MFS_Volume_Hdr; // 14 bytes
```

There is an array of 16-bit values `aFAT` right after Volume Header. The number of entries in `aFAT` equals to *the number of file records + the number of data chunks*.

```
typedef struct {
    T_MFS_Volume_Hdr vol; // Volume header
    unsigned __int16 aFAT[vol.nFiles+nDataChunks]; // File Allocation Table
} T_MFS_System_Area;
```

2.7. Data Extraction

Low-level MFS implementation does not support file names. Files are identified by numbers (from 0 to `nFiles-1`, inclusive). A file size is not stored explicitly either.

To extract a file with the specific `iFile` number, it is necessary to:

1. Calculate the index in FAT: `ind = aFAT[iFile]`. The values `0x0000` (unused) and `0xFFFE` (erased) mean that the file does not exist. The value `0xFFFF` means that the file is empty (`length == 0`).
2. Make sure that `nFiles <= ind < len(aFAT)`.
3. Extract chunk data: `data = dataChunk[ind - nFiles + nSysChunks]`.
4. Calculate the next index: `ind = aFAT[ind]`.
5. If $(0 < ind \leq \text{MFS_CHUNK_SIZE})$, then output first `ind` bytes of `data` and stop processing.
6. Output all 64 bytes of `data` and proceed to step 2.

2.8. MFS Templates Statistics

	256K	400K	1272K	
nPages	32	50	159	Total number of pages in MFS
nSysPg	2	4	13	Number of System pages
nDataPg	29	45	145	Number of Data pages
nSysChunks	119	188	586	Number of System chunks (logical)
	240	480	1560	Number of chunks on System pages (raw)
nDataChunks	3538	5490	17690	Number of Data chunks
nFiles	256	512	1024	Number of File slots
cbSys	7616	12032	37504	System area capacity
cbData	226432	351360	1132160	Data area capacity
cbTotal	234048	363392	1169664	Total capacity

3. MFS Usage

3.1. Special Files

MFS file slots with numbers up to 8 are used for special needs.

Slots 2 and 3 are used for the Anti-Replay (AR) table. The AR mechanism is intended to prevent replacement of files with their older copies (a counter value in file metadata should match a value in AR tables).

Slot 4 is used to migrate file system encryption after SVN (Secure Version Number) upgrade.

Slot 5 is used for File System Quota storage (accounting for the amount of FS storage used by a specific ME module and the number of Flash writes issued by the module).

Slot 6 contains the `/intel.cfg` file that is necessary for ME file system deployment (first run). `intel.cfg` is provided by Intel and contains a default state of the ME file system. SHA256 of `intel.cfg` is stored in System Info manifest extension.

Slot 7 contains the `/fitc.cfg` file that reflects vendor-specific deployment settings. A platform vendor can create a `fitc.cfg` file using Intel's Flash Image Tool (`fit.exe`).

Slot 8 contains the `/home/` directory that is a base directory for all files stored in MFS (except `/intel.cfg` and `/fitc.cfg`).

3.2. intel.cfg (fitc.cfg) Structure

File system configuration files are used for ME file system deployment. Both `intel.cfg` and `fitc.cfg` have an identical structure.

A file system configuration file starts with a 32-bit value `nRec` representing the number of records in a file. An array of fixed-size records `aRec` is the following. All the other bytes in the configuration file contain file data.

```
typedef struct {
    char name[12]; // File name
    unsigned __int16 unused; // Always 0
    unsigned __int16 mode; // Access mode
    unsigned __int16 opt; // Deploy options
    unsigned __int16 cb; // File data length
    unsigned __int16 uid; // Owner User ID
    unsigned __int16 gid; // Owner Group ID
    unsigned __int32 offs; // File data offset
} T_CFG_Record; // 28 bytes

typedef struct {
    unsigned __int32 nRec; // Number of records
    T_CFG_Record aRec[nRec]; // Records
    unsigned __int8 data[]; // Files data
} T_CFG;
```

The `mode` field of `T_CFG_Record` is a set of bit fields:

- Lowest 9 bits (8..0) represent UNIX-like Read/Write/eXecute permissions (`rwX`) for an owner, group, and others respectively.
- Bit 9 is set for files that must have Integrity protection enabled.
- Bit 10 is set for files that must have Encryption enabled.
- Bit 11 is set for files that must have Anti-Replay protection enabled.
- Bit 12 reflects a record type. It is set for a directory and cleared for an ordinary file.
- All other bits are always zeroed.

The `opt` field of `T_CFG_Record` is a set of bit fields too:

- Bit 0 is set for records that can be overridden by a vendor using `fitc.cfg`.
- Bit 1 is set for files updateable by the `mca` process.
- Bits 3..2 are unknown up to now.
- All other bits are always zeroed.

3.3. MFS Folder (Directory)

An MFS directory is just an array of records describing containing files. MFS file #8 always represents the `/home/` directory.

```
typedef struct {
    unsigned __int32 fileno; // iFS,salt,iFile
    unsigned __int16 mode; // Access mode
    unsigned __int16 uid; // Owner User ID
    unsigned __int16 gid; // Owner Group ID
    unsigned __int16 salt; // Another salt
    char name[12]; // File name
} T_MFS_Folder_Record; // 24 bytes
```

The `fileno` field of `T_MFS_Folder_Record` is a set of bit fields:

- Lowest 12 bits (11..0) represent a file slot index `iFile` used to identify a specific file.
- Bits 27..12 contain 0 or a randomly generated value used as salt for integrity protection.
- Bits 31-28 represent a FileSystem ID (that is always 1 for MFS stored files).

The `mode` field of `T_MFS_Folder_Record` is a set of bit fields too:

- Lowest 9 bits (8..0) represent UNIX-like Read/Write/eXecute permissions (`rwX`) for an owner, group, and others respectively.
- Bit 9 is set for files that must have Integrity protection enabled.
- Bit 10 is set for files that must have Encryption enabled.
- Bit 11 is set for files that must have Anti-Replay protection enabled.
- Bit 12 is always set to 0.
- Bit 13 is set for files protected with Non-Intel keys (see below).
- Bits 15..14 reflect a record type. It is 1 for a directory and 0 for an ordinary file.

3.4. Integrity, Encryption, Anti-Replay

If bit 9 (Integrity) of the file `mode` is set, the raw file contains an additional security blob at the end (52 bytes long). The security blob is also obligatorily added to the Anti-Replay tables (`iFile == 2, 3`) and `/home/` directory (`iFile == 8`).

```
typedef struct {
    unsigned __int8 hmac[32]; // HMAC value
    unsigned __int32 antiReplay:2; // Anti-Replay
    unsigned __int32 encryption:1; // Encryption
    unsigned __int32 unk7:7;
    unsigned __int32 iAR:10; // Index in AR table
    unsigned __int32 unk12:12;
    union {
        struct ar { // Anti-Replay data
            unsigned __int32 rnd; // AR Random value
            unsigned __int32 ctr; // AR Counter value
        };
        unsigned __int8 nonce[16]; // AES-CTR nonce
    };
} T_FileSecurity; // 52 bytes
```

The first 32 bytes of the security blob contain an HMAC value. To calculate HMAC, it is necessary to set all bytes of `T_FileSecurity.hmac` to 0 and feed to an HMAC function:

- File data
- File security blob with `hmac` field zeroed
- `T_MFS_Folder_Record.fileno`
- `T_MFS_Folder_Record.salt` (extended to a 32-bit value)

For files that have no `T_MFS_Folder_Record` (AR tables and `/home/` directory, `iFile == 2, 3, 8`) `fileno = 0x10000000+iFile`, `salt = 0`.

4. File System Security Keys

There are up to 10 security keys involved in protecting the MFS content.

4.1. RPMC Keys

Two of these keys (called RPMC HMAC keys) are used for handling RPMC (Replay-Protected Monotonic Counter). RPMC is an optional feature of the SPI Flash chip helpful for Anti-Replay Protection implementation. If this feature is not available, ME implements its own timer-based counter.

4.2. Integrity and Confidentiality Keys

MFS uses separate keys to protect Integrity and Confidentiality.

There are two sets of keys: Intel keys and Non-Intel keys. A proper set is chosen accordingly with bit 13 (Non-Intel) of `T_MFS_Folder_Record.mode`. Please note that such rare modules as `sigma`, `ptt`, `dal_ivm`, `mca` use Intel keys. The majority of protected files (including AR tables and all directories) use Non-Intel keys.

Derivation of security keys involves a 1-byte SVN (Secure Version Number) value, which is the property of ME Code Partition Directory Manifest. Keys calculated for current SVN are called "Current keys".

After SVN update (usually caused by fix of major security vulnerabilities), it must be impossible to install ME firmware with previous SVN (without direct writing SPI Flash with chip programmer). However, alteration of SVN causes alteration of related security keys. Therefore, a previous SVN value is stored in the PSVN partition and used to calculate "Previous keys". Having access to both "Previous" and "Current" keys allows migration of file system from old to new keys.

4.3. Hardware Security Engines

ME has access to hardware implemented engines intended for AES, RSA, and Hash/HMAC calculation. Another hardware security module used by ME is called SKS (presumably stands for Secure Key Storage).

SKS is able to store keys, provides AES/HMAC engines with access to stored keys, but prevents extraction of the keys. Slots 1..11 can contain 128-bit keys, while slots 12..21 are for 256-bit keys.

Access to hardware security engines is limited. Modules able to use them are limited to ROM, `bup`, and `crypto`.

In addition, there is a GEN device that contains source material for keys calculation. GEN data seems to be unique for every computer. ROM accesses GEN at an early execution stage and creates a copy of stored data. ROM uses

such data for keys derivation, but clears both GEN and copied data before passing control to `rbe` (initial module from ME firmware).

It is interesting that before wiping GEN data and passing control to `rbe`, ROM searches and executes the `idlm` module from the DMLP partition (if any exists). Thus, `idlm` can access GEN data and perform any necessary operation on it (ME 11.8 firmware was seen using that trick). For sure, the DLMP partition must be properly signed with RSA-2048.

4.4. Keys Derivation and Usage Practices

Keys are usually derived in several steps:

1. ROM uses GEN data to obtain HMAC Key.
2. ROM derives Wrapping Key using HMAC Key. A resulting key is stored in SKS.
3. ROM derives Root Key (which depends on SVN) using HMAC Key.
4. ROM wraps Root Key (using AES) and stores it in memory.
5. ROM wipes all intermediate keys (except Wrapping Key), GEN, and all data copied from it.
6. ROM passes control to ME firmware.
7. The `bup` module unwraps Root Key and loads it into SKS (unwrapping result can't be stored outside SKS).
8. `bup` derives Integrity/Confidentiality keys using an SKS-stored Root key.
9. `bup` wraps derived key and stores it in memory (or passes to another module, e.g., `vfs`, if necessary).
10. `bup` wipes plaintext key.

To use wrapped key:

11. The `bup/crypto` module unwraps requested Integrity/Confidentiality key and loads it into SKS.
12. Final HMAC/AES operation is performed using the key from SKS.

It is easy to see that Root Key is available in a non-wrapped form only during step 4, and there is no way to get it after the ROM execution is finished (control is passed to ME firmware).

Final Integrity/Confidentiality keys are available in a non-wrapped form only during step 9. However, anyone having ability to execute code with `bup` privileges could re-calculate those keys by repeating steps 7 and 8.

5. Conclusion

Our research does not claim to be exhaustive or error-free.

Nevertheless, we hope that it could help researchers involved in studying Platform security and ME internals.

Contacts

Email: pr@ptsecurity.com

Web: www.ptsecurity.com

Twitter: [@PTsecurity_UK](https://twitter.com/PTsecurity_UK)

Blog: blog.ptsecurity.com

United Kingdom, London

361 King Street,
London, W6 9NA

+44 203 769 3606